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Almost two decades ago, Professor Louis Henkin posed two
heretical questions: (1) Is there a political question doctrine? and
(2) Do we need one?1 Describing the political question doctrine,
he wrote:
The political question doctrine saw its heyday in the New
Deal Court, and received its highest measure of devotion from
Justice Frankfurter, perhaps its boldest articulation by Justice
Black in Coleman v. Miller....
Since Frankfurter and Black wrote, judicial review has had
a new birth, its character and content reformed, and its place
established as a hallmark of American political life, even a
birthright of every inhabitant. I see no place in it for an
exemption for uncertain "political questions." Would not the
part of the courts in our system, the institution of judicial
review, and their public and intellectual acceptance, fare better
if we broke open that package, assigned its authentic compo-
nents elsewhere, and threw the package away?
2
In questioning the theoretical underpinnings of the political
question doctrine, Professor Henkin relied to some extent upon
what he perceived to be the "new birth" of judicial review.3
* Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. J.D. 1989, Boston
College; B.S. 1986, University of Delaware. I would like to thank Kim Barnes, Tiziana
Polizio, and Kathryn Crockett Lyon for their valuable research and editorial assistance.
Additionally, I would like to thank Martin H. Redish for his insightful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article.
1. Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
The political question doctrine is based on the notion that certain issues are not subject to
judicial review because the issue falls within the appropriate sphere of federal executive or
legislative power. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 75 (4th ed. 1983).
2. Henkin, supra note 1, at 625 (citation omitted).
3. Id.
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During the decade preceding Professor Henkin's article, the Court
decided several cases in which it adopted a liberal interpretation of
the standing doctrine, thereby diminishing the barriers to judicial
review and expanding the judicial power.4 Professor Henkin's
perception that judicial review had taken on a renewed level of
importance may have derived in part from this relaxation of
standing requirements.5
Since the mid-1970s, however, the Court's attitude toward the
standing doctrine has been increasingly restrictive. In a string of
cases decided in the mid-1970s, the Court held that, to meet the
requirements of standing, a litigant had to prove not only that she
suffered an injury in fact, but also that her injury was caused by the
defendant's conduct and could be redressed by the court.6 Over
the last two decades the Court has applied the "causation" and
"redressability" requirements of standing in many instances. 7
Moreover, during the last decade the Court has rejected the notion
that standing is related only to whether a dispute will be presented
in an adversary context.s Rather, the Court has relied heavily
upon separation of powers principles to interpret the requirements
of standing.9 Thus, the adoption of the causation and redress-
ability elements and the incorporation of separation of powers
principles have broadened the reach of standing and made judicial
review more restrictive.
Rather than critique the current state of standing doctrine,1"
4. For example, in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), the Court held that a taxpayer
had standing to challenge a congressional statute on the grounds that the statute violated the
First Amendment, notwithstanding previous decisions rejecting the notion of taxpayer
standing. Several years later in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), the Court for the first time held that a litigant need not show
violation of a legal interest to meet the requirements of standing. Rather, the Court held
that standing will exist as long as the litigant can show injury in fact.
5. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(recognizing the "revolution in standing doctrine ... since Baker v. Carr" that resulted in the
diminution of standing requirements).
6. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995); Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Allen
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
8. See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 n.26 (1984) (relying upon separation of
powers principles to interpret the requirements of standing).
10. For a critical analysis of the standing doctrine, see, e.g., Craig Gottlieb, How
Standing Has Fallen: The Need To Separate Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U.
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this Article analyzes the effect of the developments in the law of
standing on the political question doctrine. Interestingly, the "sea-
change[s]"' that have occurred in the Court's treatment of
standing over the last three decades have coincided with a decrease
in the number of cases in which the Court has invoked the political
question doctrine to deny judicial review. In 1962, Justice Brennan
synthesized the modern political question doctrine in the landmark
case Baker v. Carr.12  Analyzing representative cases, the Baker
Court inferred six analytical threads comprising the political
question doctrine, all of which stemmed from separation of powers
principles."3 Since Baker, the Court has dismissed only two cases
on the ground that they involved a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion, 4 while expressly rejecting the application of the doctrine in
more than a dozen cases.15
PA. L. REV. 1063 (1994); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
11. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983).
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). It is interesting to note that while Baker v. Carr represents the
Court's most thorough description of the political question doctrine, the Court ultimately
held that the case did not present a political question.
13. Id. at 217; see infra text accompanying note 159.
14. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (Senate impeachment proceedings);
Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (military command and training). For a discussion of
these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 170-215.
Nixon and Gilligan are the only two cases since Baker in which a majority of the Court
applied the political question doctrine to deny judicial review. However, in Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), a plurality of the Court held that a challenge to the termination
of a treaty with Taiwan posed a nonjusticiable political question. On several other occasions
the Court has discussed the political question doctrine but ultimately decided the case
without applying the doctrine. For example, in O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972)
(political parties), the Court stayed an appellate decision because the Court entertained
"grave doubts as to the action taken by the Court of Appeals" but refused to "undertake
final resolution" of the "important question ... presented concerning justiciability." Id. at
4-5. Similarly, in Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972) (Senate elections), the Court
stated that the question of "[w]hich candidate is entitled to be seated in the Senate is, to be
sure, a nonjusticiable political question," but then went on to recharacterize the issue and
decide the case on the merits. Id. at 19.
15. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992)
(reapportionment); United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387 (1990) (legislative
enactment); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 102 (1989) (state constitutional provision); Japan
Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetecean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1986) (foreign relations);
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 122-23 (1986) (gerrymandering); County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,250 (1985) (Indian affairs); Uhler v. AFL-CIO, 468 U.S.
1310, 1312 (1984) (ratification of constitutional amendment); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v.
Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 254 n.25 (1984) (congressional action regarding the
Warsaw convention); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-43
19961
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Professor Henkin, in his 1976 article, argued that there is no
need for a separate political question doctrine.16 He suggested
that the "authentic components" of the doctrine could be assigned
elsewhere and the "package" thrown away.17 While the contours
of justiciability have changed significantly since Professor Henkin's
article, these changes, particularly recent changes narrowing the
window of judicial review, appear to strengthen rather than weaken
Professor Henkin's assertion that there is no need for a separate
political question doctrine. Specifically, when one analyzes the
changes that have occurred in the doctrines of standing and
political question during the last two decades, it appears that the
two doctrines have grown together creating a common ground
based upon the notion of separation of powers. As the Court has
heightened standing requirements to deny judicial review to a
brgader range of cases, it has found little need to invoke the
political question doctrine. Thus, during the last several decades,
the Court has rarely applied the political question doctrine. In light
of these developments, this Article submits that the separation of
powers concerns, which have historically led the Court to declare
an issue to be a nonjusticiable political question, could lead the
Court today to find a lack of standing. Since the political question
doctrine apparently retains little or no functional purpose, it should
be abolished.
II. Professor Henkin's Thesis
Professor Henkin described the political question doctrine -
in "pure theory" - as an "extra-ordinary" exercise of abstention
by the courts pursuant to which they "forego their unique and
paramount function of judicial review of constitutionality" in favor
of allowing the political branches to decide the issue.18 He recog-
nized that there are questions that the Constitution delegates
exclusively to the political branches of government and about which
(1983) (one-house veto); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 352 (1976) (politically motivated
discharge of public employees); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 697 (1974) (intra-
branch dispute); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969) (congressional exclusion of
member); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (reapportionment); Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 209-10, 237 (1962) (reapportionment).
16. Henkin, supra note 1.
17. Id. at 625.
18. Henkin, supra note 1, at 599 ("[Slome issues which prima facie and by usual criteria




the courts should play no role in deciding. 9 He argued, however,
that such delegation does not require a separate political question
doctrine because it merely involves the court's traditional function
of constitutional interpretation to determine if the issue in
controversy has been exclusively committed to one of the political
branches.2° The political question doctrine, according to Professor
Henkin, is an artificial extension of this "ordinary respect" for the
constitutionally permitted activities of the political branches of
government, which undermines the judiciary's responsibility to
interpret the Constitution.21 For this reason, he asserted that the
political question doctrine "cries for strict and skeptical scruti-
ny."
22
In reviewing the cases that established the so-called political
question doctrine, Professor Henkin suggested that in fact none of
them required the courts to invoke "extra-ordinary abstention."'
Rather, the cases could be characterized as examples of the
ordinary respect the court owes to the activities of the political
branches within the authority granted by the Constitution.2'
Accordingly, Professor Henkin asserted that the most prevalent
justification for invoking the political question doctrine - that
there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department"' - does not involve
extra-ordinary judicial abstention at all.26
This Article submits that Professor Henkin was correct in
recognizing that many of the leading political question cases could
have been decided without reliance upon a separate doctrine of
abstention for political questions. This Article reaches Professor
Henkin's conclusion, however, via a different analysis based on
recent developments in the law of standing.
19. Id. at 597.
20. Id. at 599.
21. Id. at 598.
22. Id. at 600.
23. Henkin, supra note 1, at 601.
24. Id.
25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
26. Henkin, supra note 1, at 605-06.
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III. Evolution of the Standing Doctrine
The doctrine of standing inquires whether a particular person
is a proper party to seek adjudication of a particular issue.27
Stated more directly, standing is "the very first question that is
sometimes rudely asked when one person complains of another's
actions: 'What's it to you?"'" While the three requirements of
the modern standing doctrine are derived from Article III of the
Constitution, 29 a look at the history of the doctrine illustrates that
both its source and content have changed considerably over the
years.3°
Although the case or controversy requirement of Article III
dates back to the enactment of the Constitution in 1788, the first
standing cases were not decided until the early 1920s. 31 Prior to
that time, "[c]ourts, whose jurisdiction was defined by the system
of writs, did not need to speak of standing. The question was
whether a challenger was entitled to a writ, whether he had a cause
of action, [and] whether the writ lay.''32 Essentially, a plaintiff was
allowed to bring suit only if he could show that some source of law
27. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975) (Standing asks "whether the litigant is
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."); Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968) ("[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question
is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an
adjudication of a particular issue ... .
28. Scalia, supra note 11, at 882.
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also Scalia, supra note 11, at 882 ("The requirement
of standing has been made part of American constitutional law through (for want of a better
vehicle) the provision of Art. III, Sec. 2 .... ").
30. See Winter, supra note 10, at 1375 ("The notion that standing is a bedrock
requirement of constitutional law has a surprisingly short history.").
31. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), affg Frothingham v. Mellon, 288 F.
252 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (plaintiff taxpayer could not bring suit challenging constitutionality of
federal expenditures) (The author notes that throughout this Article, this case will be
referred to as Frothingham v. Mellon.); Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922)
(plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of the Nineteenth Amendment granting women the
right to vote failed to show a sufficient interest "to afford a basis for this proceeding").
Although neither of these cases expressly:refer to standing, the Court subsequently stated
that it "first faced squarely the question whether a litigant asserting only his status as a
taxpayer has standing to maintain a suit in federal court in Frothinghtam v. Mellon .... "
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91 (1968) (footnote omitted). The first case to expressly refer
to the doctrine of standing as we know it today was United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307
U.S. 533, 560 (1939).
32. JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING OF AGE OF PUBLIC LAW 5 (1978).
Once the writ system broke down, the modem doctrine of standing began to develop. See
Winter, supra note 10, at 1377.
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granted him a right to sue. In retrospect, this requirement was
consistent with the language of Article III to the extent that a
litigant without a legal right to bring suit suffers no legally
cognizable harm that is redressable by a court and, thus, can show
no "case" or "controversy."33
A. The Early Standing Doctrine
Frothingham v. Mellon34 is one of the first cases espousing
what appears to be the nascent standing doctrine.35 In Frothing-
ham, taxpayers brought suit challenging the constitutionality of a
congressional statute providing for state appropriations that would
allegedly "increase the burden of future taxation. 36 The Court
refused to consider the merits of the claim, holding:
The party who invokes the [judicial] power must be able to
show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he
suffers in some indefinite way in common with people general-
ly.
3 7
It is unclear whether the Frothingham decision is based on
judicial self-restraint or constitutional limitation.3  At one point,
33. Winter, supra note 10, at 1396 ("Under the eighteenth century common law, rights
were synonymous with remedies, remedies were synonymous with the forms of action, and,
by algebraic logic, the forms of action were synonymous with the concept of redressable (that
is, cognizable) injuries."); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen
Suits, "Injuries," and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 170-71 (1992) ("If neither Congress
nor the common law had conferred a right to sue, no case or controversy existed. Whatever
harm had occurred was not legally cognizable at all; this was a case of damnum absque
injuria.... There was therefore a sharp distinction between an injury on the one hand (a
'harm') and a legal injury on the other.").
34. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
35. Winter, supra note 10, at 1375-76. Although Frothingham is generally considered
the first modem standing case, Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), was the first case
to reject a taxpayer suit: "Plaintiff has only the right, possessed by every citizen, to require
that the government be administered according to law and that the public moneys be not
wasted. Obviously this general right does not entitle a private citizen to institute [a suit] in
the federal courts ... ." Id. at 129-30.
36. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 486.
37. Id. at 488.
38. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 92-93 (1968) (noting that the opinion in
Frothingham can be read in both ways). Prior to Frothingham, the Court had considered the
merits of several taxpayer claims. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); Hawke v.
Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 227 (1920); Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24, 31 (1907); Millard v. Roberts,
202 U.S. 429, 438 (1906); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295 (1899). In light of these
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the Court referred to the "inconveniences" that would result if
taxpayers were allowed to challenge the administration of any
statute that would likely produce additional taxation. Addition-
ally, recognizing that standing had been conferred on municipal
taxpayers in previous cases, the Court stated that the federal
taxpayers' interest in the total federal tax revenues was "compara-
tively minute and indeterminable," implying that if the taxpayers'
bills had been larger, the Court may have conferred standing.'
Later in the opinion, however, the Court noted that, in light of the
separate functions apportioned to each of the three branches of
government, the judicial power may be exercised only when an
allegedly unconstitutional act of Congress causes some direct injury:
We [the judiciary] have no power per se to review and annul
acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional.
That question may be considered only when the justification for
some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justicia-
ble issue, is made to rest upon such act.41
Thus, while Frothingham imposed a limitation on the federal
judicial power, it did not clearly articulate the source of that
limitation.
It was not until the late 1930s that "standing" was even
considered in connection with the "case" or "controversy" require-
ment of Article III. In his concurring opinion in Coleman v.
Miller,42 Justice Frankfurter linked the concept of standing with
cases, one might argue that the barrier to taxpayer standing established in Frothingham was
a function of equity jurisprudence as opposed to constitutional restriction. See Winter, supra
note 10, at 1442. However, in Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937), the Court implied
that Frothingham had created a constitutional limitation on the Court's judicial power.
Several years later, the Court stated that a claimant's "interest must rise to the dignity of an
interest personal to him and not possessed by the people generally" to present a claim
"which constitutionally permits adjudication by courts under their general powers." Stark
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 304 (1944).
39. Frothingham, 262 U.S. at 487.
40. Id. at 486-87.
41. Id. at 488.
42. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). In Coleman, a group of Kansas legislators filed suit challenging
the ratification of the Child Labor Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Court
held that the legislators had a sufficient interest in the question to invoke the Court's
jurisdiction because their "votes against ratification have been overridden and... if they are
right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to defeat ratification." Id.
at 438. Notwithstanding the existence of standing, the Court dismissed the case under the
political question doctrine. Id. at 446, 456.
[Vol. 100:2
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the language of Article III, opining that the federal judicial power
should be limited to
matters that were the traditional concern of the courts at
Westminster and only if they arose in ways that to the expert
feel of lawyers constituted "Cases" or "Controversies." It was
not for courts to meddle with matters that required no subtlety
to be identified as political issues. And even as to the kinds of
questions which were the staple of judicial business, it was not
for courts to pass upon them as abstract, intellectual problems
but only if a concrete, living contest between adversaries called
for the arbitrament of law.
43
Justice Frankfurter argued that because the legislators asserted
public - not private - rights, the legislators had no standing to
maintain the suit.44
It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that a majority of the
Court subscribed to the notion that the standing doctrine derives
from the case or controversy requirement. In Doremus v. Board
of Education,45 the Court stated:
[B]ecause our own jurisdiction is cast in terms of "case or
controversy," we cannot accept as the basis for review, nor as
the basis for conclusive disposition of an issue of federal law
without review, any procedure which does not constitute
such.4
Yet, despite the Court's recognition of the link between
standing and the case or controversy requirement of Article III, the
Court's standing analysis remained the same; it continued to focus
on the litigant's interest in the controversy and the existence of a
legally cognizable injury. For example, in discussing whether a
group of voters had standing to challenge an apportionment statute
in Baker v. Carr,47 the Court focused on the voters' interest in the
43. Id. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Frankfurter went
on to state that "[n]o matter how seriously infringement of the Constitution may be called
into question, this is not the tribunal for its challenge except by those who have some
specialized interest of their own to vindicate, apart from a political concern which belongs
to all." Id. at 464.
44. Id. at 464-65.
45. 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (dismissing a challenge to a New Jersey statute providing for
the daily reading of verses from the Old Testament in public school on ground that plaintiff
taxpayers lacked standing).
46. Id. at 434.
47. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, a group of Tennessee voters brought suit alleging
denial of their right to equal protection under the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
1996]
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48issue and whether they could present a cogent argument.
Ultimately, the Court held that the plaintiffs had standing to pursue
the suit, noting:
It would not be necessary to decide whether appellants'
allegations of impairment of their votes ... will, ultimately,
entitle them to any relief, in order to hold that they have
standing to seek it. If such impairment does produce a legally
cognizable injury, they are among those who have sustained
it.
49
Thus, consistent with the development of the doctrine up to this
point, the crucial element of standing was the allegation of a legally
cognizable injury.50
B. The "Revolution" in Standing Doctrine: Expanding the
Definition of Injury
The years following Baker v. Carr marked the beginning of a
"revolution" in the standing doctrine51 characterized by the
Court's increased interest in the doctrine52 and the expansion of
categories of injuries that would satisfy standing requirements.53
One case that illustrates how the Court expanded the definition of
injury is Flast v. Cohen.54 In Flast, the Court departed from its
Amendment. Id. at 187-88. Voters residing in five different counties of Tennessee brought
suit against the Tennessee Secretary of State, Attorney General, Coordinator of Election,
and members of the State Board of Elections. Id. at 204-05. The voters alleged that they
were injured because an outdated Tennessee statute apportioning the seats of the General
Assembly effected a grossly disproportionate representation of the voting population, thus
diluting the political voice of some counties compared to other, more favored counties. Id.
at 207. The voters requested that the Court declare the Tennessee statute unconstitutional
and enjoin any further elections pursuant to the statute. Id. at 194-95.
48. Id. at 204 (noting that the "gist of the question of standing" is whether the voters
have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions").
49. Id. at 208.
50. Apparently, the Court was not concerned with whether the defendants had caused
the alleged injury or whether the Court would be able to fashion an appropriate remedy.
51. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).
52. Sunstein, supra note 33, at 169. The Supreme Court has discussed standing in terms
of Article III on 117 occasions. Id. Of those 117 discussions of standing, 55 occurred after
1985; 71 occurred after 1980; and 109 occurred after 1965. Id.
53. Id.; Linda R.S. V. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616-17 (1973).
54. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). In Flast, a group of taxpayers filed suit challenging Titles I and
II of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (the "Act"). The complaint
alleged that the Act contravened the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
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previous standing doctrine by creating an exception to the bar
against taxpayer standing announced in Frothingham. According
to the Court, the case or controversy requirement embodies two
separate but related policy considerations: (1) that the business of
the federal courts is limited to questions presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution
through the judicial process; and (2) that the role assigned to the
judiciary shall not intrude upon areas committed to the other
branches of government.5 6 The Court stated that only the first of
these policies is relevant to standing:
[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is
whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper
party to request an adjudication of a particular issue and not
whether the issue itself is justiciable ....
... The question whether a particular person is a proper
party to maintain the action does not, by its own force, raise
separation of powers problems related to improper judicial
interference in areas committed to other branches of the
Federal Government. Such problems arise, if at all, only from
the substantive issues the individual seeks to have adjudicated.
Thus, in terms of Article III limitations on federal court
jurisdiction, the question of standing is related only to whether
the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
Amendment by appropriating federal funds to finance instruction in religious schools and
purchase textbooks and other instructional materials for use in such schools. Id. at 85-86.
The taxpayers requested (1) a declaration that the Act did not authorize the appropriation
of funds for religious purposes or, in the alternative, to the extent the Act did authorize
appropriations for such religious purposes, it is unconstitutional and void; and (2) an
injunction prohibiting those charged with administering the Act from approving any
expenditure of federal funds for religious purposes. Id. at 87-88.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 94-95. The Court described the case or controversy requirement as follows:
As is so often the situation in constitutional adjudication, those two words have
an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged
complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government.
Embodied in the words "cases" and "controversies" are two complementary but
somewhat different limitations. In part those words limit the business of federal
courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those
words define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power




adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of judicial resolution. 7
Quoting Baker v. Carr, the Court stated that a litigant will be
considered a proper party to request an adjudication if the party
has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controver-
sy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.""8  The Court
concluded that there is no absolute constitutional barrier to
taxpayer standing as some may have inferred from Frothingham
Thus, if a taxpayer can allege the requisite personal stake in the
outcome, the Court will find standing.'
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court effected a "major
doctrinal shift" in the law of standing.6" Recognizing a "trend
... toward enlargement of the class of people who may protest
administrative action," the Court, in Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, held that a plaintiff need not
show violation of a "legal interest" to meet the requirements of
standing.62 In Camp, petitioners63 filed suit challenging a ruling
by the Comptroller of the Currency allowing national banks to
provide data processing services to other banks and to bank
57. Id. at 99-101. Others have also suggested that the standing inquiry should focus on
the litigant's interest in the controversy, rather than on the fitness of the issue for
adjudication. See, e.g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 56 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 122 (3d ed. 1988).
58. Flast, 392 U.S. at 99.
59. Id. at 101.
60. Id. To determine whether the taxpayers in Flast had satisfied the constitutional
requirements of Article III, the Court stated that the taxpayers had to show a logical nexus
between their status as taxpayers and the claim they sought to adjudicate. Id. at 102. To
establish a nexus, the claimant must show: (1) a logical link between her status as a taxpayer
and the challenged legislation; and (2) a nexus between her status as a taxpayer and the
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Id. Applying these criteria to the
taxpayers in Flast, the Court held that since the Establishment Clause imposes a specific
restriction on Congress's tax-and-spend power and because the taxpayers wished to challenge
Congress's exercise of its tax-and-spend power, the taxpayers had sufficiently satisfied the
two-pronged test and thus had standing to pursue the suit. Id. at 103.
61. BATOR ET AL., supra note 56, at 162.
62. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1970) ("The 'legal interest' test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different.
It concerns, apart from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the question whether the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.").
63. The petitioners were in the business of selling data processing services.
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customers.64 Abandoning the legal interest test to determine
petitioners' standing, the Court instead applied a two-pronged test:
(1) did the petitioners suffer an injury in fact, economic or other-
wise?65 and (2) are the petitioners arguably within the zone of
interest protected by a relevant statute? 66 The Court found that
the petitioners had met the injury in fact requirement because they
had alleged that the additional competition in providing data
processing services might entail future loss of profits and also that
one of the respondent banks was performing, or preparing to
perform, services for two customers to whom one of the petitioners
had already agreed to provide services. 67  The Court held that
since the petitioners were within the "zone of interest" of the Bank
Service Corporation Act of 1962, and since Congress had not
expressly precluded judicial review in that Act, the petitioners had
standing to bring suit.' The Court expressly reserved judgment,
however, on whether the Bank Service Corporation Act or any
other statute provided a legal interest that protected petitioners
from the alleged activity, noting that these questions go to the
merits of the dispute rather than to standing.
69
The Camp Court apparently wished to simplify the test for
standing by focusing on the factual determination of whether an
injury exists, as opposed to the arguably more complex legal
question of whether a legal interest has been violated.7' In reality,
however, the Court did not simplify the analysis. It merely
rephrased the ultimate question: what is a judicially cognizable
64. Camp, 397 U.S. at 151.
65. Id. at 152.
66. Id. at 155-56. In subsequent cases, the Court declared that this "zone of interest"
test is not a constitutional requirement, but rather a prudential concern. See Simon v.
Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976).
67. Camp, 397 U.S. at 155-56.
68. Id.; see also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (holding that tenant farmers had
standing under the Administrative Procedure Act to challenge a regulation promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture because they suffered injury in fact and were within the zone
of interest of the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965). Additionally, there was no evidence
that Congress intended to preclude judicial review.
69. Camp, 397 U.S. at 158.
70. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CAL. L. REV.
1915, 1924 (1986) ("The terminology employed - injury 'in fact' rather than 'in law,'
layperson's injury rather than lawyer's injury - suggests the Court's desire to convert the
case or controversy hurdle to a straightforward and objective measurement uninfluenced by
the attractiveness of the cause of action or the political predilections of the decisionmaker.").
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injury?71 Regardless of the terminology used, the injury determi-
nation involves an exploration of what we wish to recognize as
harm. It is not merely a fact-based inquiry; rather, it is based on
a normative judgment about what ought to constitute a judicially
cognizable injury.
72
C. Development of the Causation and Redressability Elements
While the Court in Flast and Camp expanded the categories of
injuries that would satisfy the standing requirements - thereby
making it easier for litigants to obtain federal judicial review - this
so-called "revolution" in the standing doctrine was short-lived.
Several years after the Camp decision, the Court began to narrow
the standing doctrine, first by adding additional requirements, and
later by relying on separation of powers considerations.
In a line of cases decided during the mid-1970s, the Court
established that standing requires a plaintiff to show not only that
she has been injured, but also that her injury is fairly traceable to
the defendant's conduct and that the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable court decision.73 One case that illustrates how
these additional criteria - causation and redressability - have
narrowed the application of standing is Linda R.S. v. Richard D.74
In that case, the mother of an illegitimate child filed suit challeng-
ing the discriminatory application of Article 602 of the Texas Penal
Code, which required that any parent who neglected to pay child
support be prosecuted and, if convicted, punished by confinement
in the county jail.75 The plaintiff requested an injunction against
the district attorney prohibiting him from declining to prosecute the
father of her child because the child was born out of wedlock.76
Considering whether the plaintiff had standing to sue, the Court
stated:
71. Sunstein, supra note 33, at 188-89. "[I]n every case, the person who brings a lawsuit
believes that she has indeed suffered an injury in fact." Id. at 189. Thus, whether referred
to as a "legally cognizable injury" or as an "injury in fact," the courts necessarily must make
policy judgments on what injuries they will recognize.
72. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Justice Scalia, Standing, and Public Law Litigation, 42 DUKE
L.J. 1141, 1155-57 (1993).
73. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICrION 54 n.5 (2d ed. 1994); Sunstein, supra
note 33, at 193.
74. 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
75. Id. at 614-15.
76. Id. at 616.
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To be sure, appellant no doubt suffered an injury stemming
from the failure of her child's father to contribute support
payments. But the bare existence of an abstract injury meets
only the first half of the standing requirement. "The party who
invokes [judicial] power must be able to show.., that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
injury as the result of [a statute's] enforcement. ''77
The Court held that the appellant lacked standing because she
failed to show that her injury was caused by the district attorney's
alleged violation of the Texas Penal Code and because it was "only
speculative" that prosecution of the father would result in future
payment of child support.78
Two years later in Warth v. Seldin,79 the Court again relied
upon the causation/redressability requirement to deny standing. In
Warth, various residents of the Rochester, New York area brought
suit against the Town of Penfield and its Zoning, Planning, and
Town Boards." The suit challenged a Penfield zoning ordinance on
the ground that it unconstitutionally excluded persons of low and
moderate income from living in the town." The plaintiffs request-
ed that the Court enjoin the defendants from enforcing the zoning
ordinance, order the defendants to enact a new ordinance, and
award actual and exemplary damages.' The Court denied
standing to the low and moderate income plaintiffs because they
failed to establish that, but for the exclusionary zoning ordinance,
suitable and affordable housing would be constructed in Penfield.'
77. Id. at 618 (alterations in original) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
78. Id. 618-19. In his dissent, Justice White stated that the Court should not consider
redressability an element of standing. Id. at 620.
79. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
80. Id. at 493.
81. Id. at 493-96.
82. Id. at 496.
83. Specifically, the Court noted that
the record is devoid of any indication that these projects, or other like projects,
would have satisfied petitioners' needs at prices they could afford, or that, were
the court to remove the obstructions attributable to respondents, such relief would
benefit petitioners. Indeed, petitioners' descriptions of their individual financial
situations and housing needs suggest precisely the contrary - that their inability
to reside in Penfield is the consequence of the economics of the area housing
market, rather than of respondents' assertedly illegal acts.
Id. at 506. The Court also denied standing to individual taxpayers and several other
organization plaintiffs.
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One year later, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights
Organization,84 groups of indigent individuals brought suit against
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Commissioner of the IRS
challenging a Revenue Ruling that provided tax-exempt status to
nonprofit hospitals that offered only limited medical services to
indigent patients. 85  The plaintiffs alleged that they had been
disadvantaged by several tax-exempt hospitals that. refused to
provide the plaintiffs with needed hospital services because they
were unable to pay.86 Although the Court recognized that at least
some of the plaintiffs had suffered actual injury from denial of
medical services, such injuries were insufficient to create standing
to sue the government officials named as defendants.87 As a
result, the Court refused to grant standing because the plaintiffs
failed to show that the denial of access to hospital services resulted
from the IRS policy or that a change in the policy would provide
the plaintiffs with the medical treatment they desired.88
D. Standing and Separation of Powers
During the 1980s the Court continued to apply the injury,
causation, and redressability requirements of standing, but it
changed the thrust of the standing analysis by emphasizing a close
relationship between standing and the principle of separation of
powers. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc. illustrates this change.89
84. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
85. Id. at 29-32.
86. Id. at 32-33.
87. Id. at 40-41.
88. Id. at 42-43 ("It is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in the
complaint fairly can be traced to [defendants' policy] or instead result from decisions made
by the hospitals without regard to the tax implications.").
89. 454 U.S. 464 (1982). The Valley Forge case arose out of the transfer of surplus
government land by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) to the
Valley Forge Christian College (Valley Forge). Learning of the transfer through a news
release, a nonprofit organization consisting of 90,000 taxpaying members filed suit alleging
that the transfer violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 468-69.
The plaintiffs requested the Court to declare the conveyance null and void and to order
Valley Forge to convey the property back to the United States. Id. The plaintiffs alleged
that they suffered a sufficient injury to confer standing because each member "'would be
deprived of the fair and constitutional use of his (her) tax dollar for constitutional purposes
in violation of his (her) rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion."' Id. at 469 (citation omitted). The Court denied standing. Applying the Flast two-
pronged test, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not have standing as taxpayers because
their claim was not a challenge to a congressional exercise of the tax and spend power under
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
Acknowledging that its own lack of precision in prior decisions had
created ambiguity in the limits and contours of the standing
doctrine,9" the Court in Valley Forge attempted to clarify the
doctrine. The Court stated:
[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who
invokes the court's authority to "show that he personally has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," and that the injury
"fairly can be traced to the challenged action" and "is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision."'"
In a notable departure from its statement in Flast v. Cohen,92 the
Court stated that "standing is not measured by the intensity of the
litigant's interest or the fervor of his advocacy. ' ' '
The Court in Valley Forge emphasized that separation of
powers principles are closely related to standing. While the Flast
Court specifically stated that the question of standing does not
"raise separation of powers problems related to improper judicial
interference in areas committed to other branches of the Federal
Government,"94 the Court in Valley Forge identified the three
constitutional requirements of standing and stated that through
these requirements
Art[icle] III limit[s] the federal judicial power "to those disputes
which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a system
Article I, Section 8, as in Fast, but rather was a challenge to a HEW decision to transfer
property pursuant to a congressional act created under the Property Clause, Article IV,
Section 3, Clause 2. Id. at 478-80. Additionally, the Court held that the plaintiffs could not
meet the requirements for citizen standing because the plaintiffs could show no personal
injury suffered as a result of the alleged constitutional violation. Id. at 485.
90. Id. at 471, 475 ("[T]he concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with
complete consistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court .... ").
91. Id. at 472 (citations omitted). In addition to the Article III requirements, the Court
recognized several prudential limitations that bear on the question of standing. These
limitations include the bar against asserting the rights of third parties, the bar against
asserting generalized grievances and the requirement that the plaintiff's complaint fall within
the zone of interest intended to be regulated by the law at issue. Id. at 474-75.
92. 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) ("Standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to
be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed
as capable of judicial resolution.").
93. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 486.
94. Flast, 392 U.S. at 100.
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of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be
capable of resolution through the judicial process. '
Echoing the reasoning often used to justify the political question
doctrine,96 the Court noted:
"[R]epeated and essentially head-on confrontations between the
life-tenured branch and the representative branches of govern-
ment will not, in the long run, be beneficial to either. The
public confidence essential to the former and the vitality critical
to the latter may well erode if we do not exercise self-restraint
in the utilization of our power to negative the actions of the
other branches."97
Two years after Valley Forge, the Court went even further in
drawing a link between Article III standing and separation of
powers. In Allen v. Wright,98 the Court stated that
95. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. at 97). It is
interesting that the Court chose to quote Rast for this proposition. In fact, the language was
lifted from a portion of the Flast opinion in which the Court discusses the doctrines of
justiciability generally, not standing particularly. Later in the Flast opinion, the Court
specifically states that standing does not raise separation of powers problems. Fast, 392 U.S.
at 99-100.
96. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Forward: The Passive
Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REV. 40, 75 (1961) (discussing rationale for the political question
doctrine).
97. 454 U.S. at 474 (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring) (alteration in original)). The Court had used similar reasoning
several years earlier in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208,
222 (1974) (standing denied when "the relief sought [would] produce[] a confrontation with
one of the coordinate branches of the Government").
98. 468 U.S. 737 (1984). In Allen, the Court denied standing to the parents of black
school children who challenged the effectiveness of IRS procedures for denying tax-exempt
status to private schools engaged in racially discriminatory practices. Id. The named
plaintiffs were parents of children attending public schools in school districts undergoing.
desegregation. They brought a nationwide class action suit alleging that despite IRS policy
denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory schools, some private schools located in
desegregating districts were granted tax-exempt status even though they had racially
discriminatory policies. Id. at 744. The plaintiffs alleged that the grant of tax-exempt status
to these institutions was unlawful and caused them harm by (1) providing federal financial
aid and support to racially segregated and discriminatory schools; and (2) encouraging
discriminatory schools to create opportunities for white children who would then avoid
attendance in desegregating public schools and thus frustrate the efforts of the federal courts
to desegregate the public schools. Id. at 745. Significantly, the parents did not allege that
their children had been denied admission to a school allegedly involved in discriminatory
practices. The plaintiffs requested the court to declare the IRS policies and practices
unlawful, to require the IRS to deny tax-exempt status to any private school meeting certain




the law of Art. III standing is built on a single basic idea - the
idea of separation of powers ....
... [T]he standing inquiry must be answered by reference
to the Art. III notion that federal courts may exercise powers
only "in the last resort, and as a necessity," and only when
adjudication is "consistent with a system of separated powers
and [the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of
resolution through the judicial process." 99
Applying these principles, the Court held that the plaintiffs had
failed to allege an injury sufficient to confer standing. " In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stated:
The idea of separation of powers that underlies standing
doctrine explains why our cases preclude the conclusion that
respondents' alleged injury "fairly can be traced to the chal-
lenged action" of the IRS. That conclusion would pave the way
generally for suits challenging, not specifically identifiable
Government violations of law, but the particular programs
agencies establish to carry out their legal obligations ....
"Carried to its logical end, [respondents'] approach
would have the federal courts as virtually continuing
While the case was pending, the IRS proposed new procedures to tighten the
requirements for tax-exempt status. Id. at 747-48. Congress, however, refused to allow
implementation of the proposed new procedures. The District Court apparently felt uneasy
about contradicting the will of Congress and thus dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint,
concluding "that respondents lack standing, that the judicial task proposed by respondents
is inappropriately intrusive for a federal court, and that awarding the requested relief would
be contrary to the will of Congress ...." Id. at 748.
99. Id. at 752 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). Interestingly, the Court again
chose to lift a portion of the quoted language from Flast v. Cohen, even though that case
specifically denied the existence of a relationship between standing and separation of powers.
100. Id. at 753. The first alleged injury - the provision of financial aid by the
government to discriminatory schools - was insufficient to support standing because it did
not amount to a judicially cognizable injury. Id. The mere fact that the government
allegedly acted illegally was not an adequate injury to support standing because individuals
have no "shared individuated fight" to require the government to act in accordance with the
law. Id. at 754-55. Alternatively, while racial discrimination may cause a "stigmatizing
injury" sufficient to support standing, such an injury was not present in this case because
neither the plaintiffs nor their children were personally denied equal treatment. Id. The
second alleged injury - that financial advantages provided to discriminatory schools in
desegregating districts impaired the plaintiffs' children's ability to obtain an education in a
desegregated public school - was also insufficient to confer standing. Id. at 756. Although
the Court stressed that this injury is "not only judicially cognizable but ... one of the most
serious injuries recognized in our legal system," id. at 756, the injury was nonetheless
insufficient to confer standing because "[tihe line of causation between [the IRS conduct] and
desegregation of respondents' schools is attenuated at best." Id. at 757.
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monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive
action; such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting
through its committees and the 'power of the purse'; it is
not the role of the judiciary, absent actual present or
immediately threatened injury resulting from unlawful
governmental action.' 1
In the wake of Allen v. Wright, the Court has reaffirmed the
close relationship between Article III standing and separation of
powers. For example, in 1992, Justice Scalia authored the majority
opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife."° In Lujan, the Court
stated that the case or controversy requirement of Article III
contains "landmarks" - including standing - that restrain the
judicial power to the "common understanding of what activities are
appropriate to ... courts."1 °3  In the same year, Justice Scalia
asserted that the notion that standing exists to "assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues" has been
repudiated." a Justice Scalia explained that it is currently under-
stood that standing serves as a mechanism to protect the separation
of powers.'0 5
In 1993, Justice Clarence Thomas brought the standing
doctrine into focus once more in Northeastern Florida Chapter of
101. Id. at 759-60 (alteration in original) (indenting in original) (citation omitted).
102. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). In Lujan, several organizations dedicated to the conservation
of wildlife filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") alleging that the
interpretation by the Interior Department of .the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") was too
narrow. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction requiring the
Secretary to promulgate a new regulation incorporating a broader interpretation of the Act.
Id. at 559. The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not show
an imminent threat of harm. Id. at 564.
After holding that the plaintiffs failed to show an injury sufficient to confer standing,
the Court explained that plaintiffs could not acquire standing under the citizen suit provision
in the ESA. Id. at 572-74. The Court stated:
Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the invitation of Congress, in
ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, they would be
discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role
of the Third Branch - one of the essential elements that identifies those "Cases"
and "Controversies" that are the business of the courts rather than of the political
branches. "The province of the court ... is, solely, to decide on the rights of
individuals." Vindicating the public interest (including the public interest in
Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress
and the Chief Executive.
Id. at 576.
103. Id. at 559-60.




Associated General Contractors of America v. City of Jackson-
ville."° Justice Thomas stated:
The doctrine of standing is "an essential and unchanging part
of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III" which
itself "defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of
separation of powers on which the Federal Government is
founded."'' 7
Thus, it appears that the Court continues to recognize a close
relationship between the standing doctrine and the concept of
separation of powers.
IV. The Standing Requirements: What Do They Mean?
The modern standing doctrine consists of three constitutionally
required elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized; and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or
'hypothetical."' Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of - the injury
has to be "fairly... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action
of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be
"likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will
be "redressed by a favorable decision."'
8
A. The Injury Requirement
Analysis of the injury requirement requires an assessment of:
(1) the directness or actuality of the alleged injury; and (2) the
judicial cognizability of the interest alleged to be injured."° The
first inquiry protects traditional standing concerns by ensuring that
the plaintiff has a "personal stake" in the litigation." ° To satisfy
this aspect of the injury requirement, plaintiffs must show that they
"ha[ve] sustained or [are] immediately in danger of sustaining some
106. 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993).
107. Id. at 2301 (citations omitted).
108. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).
109. Nichol, supra note 70, at 1918. Professor Nichol asserts that while the Court
regularly addresses the directness and actuality of the alleged injury, it has failed to
adequately articulate or address the judicial cognizability prong of the injury calculus. Id.
at 1918, 1930 n.97, n.100.
110. Id. at 1927.
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direct injury"; an "[a]bstract injury" will not be enough.111 The
Court illustrated the application of this requirement in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons.t1 2  In Lyons, the plaintiff brought suit against
the city of Los Angeles and four of its officers seeking damages,
injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment.1 3 The complaint
alleged that the plaintiff was stopped by Los Angeles police officers
for a routine traffic violation and the officers, without provocation
or justification, applied a chokehold, which injured the plaintiff's
larynx and caused him to loose consciousness."l 4 Lyons chal-
lenged the use of the chokehold and requested the Court to declare
this practice unconstitutional and to issue an injunction prohibiting
the use of chokeholds unless an officer is threatened with deadly
force.'1 5 In evaluating the alleged injury for purposes of standing,
the Court distinguished between those counts seeking damages and
those counts seeking equitable relief."1 6 Although Lyons had
standing to seek damages for the injuries he actually incurred, he
did not have standing to stop the Los Angeles Police Department
from applying chokeholds prospectively because the threat that
Lyons would again be subjected to an illegal chokehold was
speculative. 7
111. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 97.
114. Id. at 97-98. Justice Marshall described the uncontested facts as follows:
[A]t about 2 a.m. on October 6, 1976, Lyons was pulled over to the curb by two
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for a traffic infraction
because one of his taillights was burned out. The officers greeted him with drawn
revolvers as he exited from his car. Lyons was told to face his car and spread his
legs. He did so. He was then ordered to clasp his hands and put them on top of
his head. He again complied. After one of the officers completed a patdown
search, Lyons dropped his hands, but was ordered to place them back above his
head, and one of the officers grabbed Lyons' hands and slammed them onto his
head. Lyons complained about the pain caused by the ring of keys he was holding
in his hand. Within 5 to 10 seconds, the officer began to choke Lyons by applying
a forearm against his throat. As Lyons struggled for air, the officer handcuffed
him, but continued to apply the chokehold until he blacked out. When Lyons
regained consciousness, he was lying face down on the ground, choking, gasping
for air, and spitting up blood and dirt. He had urinated and defecated. He was
issued a traffic citation and released.
Id. at 114-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 98.
116. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105.
117. Id. at 105-06, 108. To have standing to seek injunctive relief, the plaintiff would
have to allege a real and immediate threat that not only would he be stopped by Los
Angeles police officers in the future, but also that he would be subjected to a chokehold.
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Prior to Lyons, the Court had never before determined
standing based upon the remedy sought."n This reliance on the
remedy may have reflected the Court's concern with allowing
federal courts to interfere with the operations of state govern-
ments."9 The Court recognized that although individual states
may choose to allow their courts to oversee the conduct of law
enforcement authorities on a continuing basis, this in not the
appropriate role of the federal courts absent compelling facts. 20
Thus, by holding that the threat of future harm to Lyons was too
speculative to satisfy the injury requirement of standing, the Court
protected the delicate balance of powers between the state and
federal governments."'
The second aspect of the injury analysis - the judicial cogniz-
ability of the interest alleged to be injured - requires the courts to
make a normative judgment about which interests merit the
exercise of the federal judicial power."n While the Court has not
expressly identified judicial cognizability as a distinct aspect of the
injury requirement," 3 various Supreme Court decisions indicate
that certain interests will be sufficient for judicial review while
others will not. For example, the Court has held that injury to the
following interests will be sufficient for standing: the interest in
observing an animal species; 24 the interest in bringing suit in the
forum of one's choice;"2 the interest in achieving economic
advantage; 6 and the interest in maintaining an undiluted
Id.
118. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall notes that "the Court's approach to
standing is wholly inconsistent with well-established standing principles and clashes with our
longstanding conception of the remedial powers of a court and what is necessary to invoke
the authority of a court to resolve a particular dispute." Id. at 131 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 63.
119. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 112 ("[R]ecognition of the need for a proper balance between
state and federal authority counsels restraint in the issuance of injunctions against state
officers engaged in the administration of the States' criminal laws in the absence of
irreparable injury which is both great and immediate.").
120. Id. at 113.
121. Id.
122. Nichol, supra note 72, at 1157-59; Nichol, supra note 70, at 1918.
123. Nichol, supra note 70, at 1918, 1930 n.97 (asserting that the Court's treatment of the
injury requirement has been incomplete to the extent that the Court has not recognized the
cognizability aspect of the inquiry).
124. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562-63 (1992).
125. International Primate Protection League v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund,
500 U.S. 72 (1991).
126. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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vote.1 27  On the other hand, the Court has held that injury to the
following interests will not be sufficient for standing: the interest
in maintaining a certain racial composition of statewide voting
districts;1" the interest in stopping the government from providing
financial aid to discriminatory schools; 129 the interest in "marital
happiness";13° the interest in obtaining public disclosure of the
CIA budget;13 and the interest in compliance by government
officials with the Incompatibility Clause of the United States
Constitution.13 2  Although the Court actively distinguishes be-
tween those interests that are and are not judicially cognizable, it
has not defined the criteria by which it makes these distinctions.
In an attempt to define criteria for the cognizability analysis,
Professor Nichol suggests that courts assessing judicial cognizability
should focus on two factors: (1) the "public acceptance of the
interest in question"; and (2) the appropriate role of the judiciary
vis-a-vis the other branches of government."' The recent explo-
sion of environmental suits provides a good example of how public
acceptance of an interest bears upon cognizability. Suppose a
plaintiff filed suit alleging that certain conduct violated her interest
in the use and enjoyment of the environment. If the suit were filed
around the turn of the century, it is likely that the case would have
been dismissed for failing to allege a judicially cognizable injury
sufficient to confer standing. 34 If the suit were filed today,
however, the Court would likely find the injury sufficient to confer
standing)3 The standing analysis of a factually identical scenario
at these two different points in time leads to different conclusions
127. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
128. United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
129. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
130. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 128 (1973).
131. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
132. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
133. Nichol, supia note 70, at 1943 ("Cognizability analysis ... must incorporate a
substantial evaluation of the public acceptance of the interest in question' Cognizable
interests must have been 'capped' as public values. Moreover, in the 'generalized grievance'
actions challenging noncompliance with the Constitution, cognizability analysis must focus
on the propriety of judicial recognition of the proffered claims."). Professor Nichol suggests
that "[iut might be best to assume ... that generalized constitutional claims are not the
appropriate subject of judicial recognition unless they trigger a special need for intervention."
Id. at 1944. Such a special need might exist when a constitutional claim calls into question
a violation or infringement of the democratic process.
134. Id. at 1933-34.
135. Id.; see United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proceedings
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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because, during the intervening years, the public has accepted
concern for the environment as a value worthy of judicial protec-
tion.1
6
"Public acceptance" of an issue is not necessarily sufficient,
however, to make an injury judicially cognizable. For example, the
Court has held that an individual's interest in enforcing certain
constitutional provisions is not sufficient to confer standing,37
even though it would seem that inclusion of the interest in the text
of the Constitution is strong evidence of public acceptance.
38
Rather, cognizability also depends on whether a claim is appropri-
ately vindicated by the judiciary.139  This aspect of the cogniz-
ability analysis focuses on the role of the federal courts in a
constitutional democracy based upon separated powers.
The Constitution creates three branches of government and
divides governmental power among them. Consistent with demo-
cratic principles, the Constitution delegates the power to make
policy decisions'to the representative branches of government.
14'
136. Nichol, supra note 70, at 1933. In certain cases, public acceptance of an interest may
be inferred from legislative recognition of the interest. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
(1975), an organization (Metro-Act), comprised in part of residents of the town of Penfield,
challenged an allegedly exclusionary Penfield zoning ordinance on the ground that it
deprived its members of the "benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated
community." Id. at 512. The Court denied standing to Metro-Act on the ground that the
alleged injury - deprivation of the right to live in an integrated community - did not satisfy
the injury in fact requirement. Id. at 513-14. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
distinguished the situation in Warth from that in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
In Trafficante, residents of an apartment complex alleged-that their landlord violated
the Civil Rights Act of 1968 by discriminating against rental applicants and thus deprived
them of "the social benefits of living in an integrated community." Trafficante, 409 U.S. at
208. Although the Court held that the plaintiffs in Trafficante had standing to sue, the Court
in Warth found a "critical distinction" between the two cases which resulted in an opposite
conclusion. Warth, 422 U.S. at 513. Noting that "Congress may create a statutory right or
entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer standing to sue even where the
plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the absence of statute," the
Court held that because Metro-Act did not allege violation of a congressional statute, the
alleged injury to an interest in interracial association was insufficient to confer standing. Id.
at 514. Thus, the Court in Warth apparently believed that legislative recognition was
necessary to show public acceptance of this particular interest.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (Taxing and Spending
Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section
6 of the United States Constitution).
138. Nichol, supra note 70, at 1937.
139. Id. at 1943.
140. See U.S. CONST. arts. 1, II.
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While the decisions of the representative branches are driven by
the will of the majority of the citizenry, such decisions must fall
within boundaries established by the Constitution.4  These
constitutional boundaries are mandatory, as opposed to advisory,
and may only be amended through a detailed process requiring a
super-majority vote" Because these mandatory counter-
majoritarian boundaries would be virtually meaningless if the
political branches served as the final arbiters of their meaning, the
judicial branch - formally insulated from majoritarian influence -
is entrusted with the tasks of interpreting the provisions and
enforcing the boundaries of the Constitution.143 Judicial cogniz-
ability, therefore, depends not only on whether a claim invokes a
generally accepted or legislatively endorsed public value, but also
on whether the claim falls within the policy-making prerogative of
the representative branches or whether the claim implicates a
constitutional limitation that is intended to be enforced by the
unrepresentative judicial branch.
B. Causation and Redressability
In addition to showing an actual and judicially cognizable
injury, plaintiffs must allege that their injuries resulted from the
defendant's conduct and that a favorable court decision will redress
the injury.1" Although the Court has identified causation and
redressability as separate requirements of the standing analysis,' a
they are closely related and often prompt identical inquires.
146
Satisfaction of the causation and redressability requirements is
dependent on what the Court characterizes as the alleged injury.
For example, in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.,147 the Court character-
ized the plaintiff's alleged injury as a lack of child support. Based
on this characterization, the Court held that the plaintiff lacked
141. These constitutional boundaries relate to the structure of the federal government,
the scope of powers conferred on each branch of the government or the authority of the
government to restrict individual liberty. MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
THE POLMCAL ORDER 77 (1991).
142. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. V (setting forth the requirements for amending the United
States Constitution).
143. REDISH, supra note 141, at 5.
144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 72.
145. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
146. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 72. If the defendant's conduct is the cause of the
plaintiffs injury, then halting the conduct will redress the injury. Id.
147. 410 U.S. 614 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes 73-78.
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standing because she failed to show that her injury was caused by
the district attorney's failure to prosecute the father of her child for
support since it was only speculative whether prosecution of the
father would result in payment.1 8 If the Court had characterized
the injury as a denial of equal protection of the law rather than as
a lack of child support payments, the causation and redressability
requirements would have been satisfied. The district attorney's
alleged refusal to prosecute the fathers of illegitimate children
would have satisfied the causation requirement, while the requested
relief - an injunction prohibiting the district attorney from
declining to prosecute the father of the plaintiff's child - would
have satisfied the redressability requirement. Although the
standing analysis consists of three separate inquires, they are closely
related to one another.
By tracing the evolution of the modern standing doctrine, this
Article has illustrated how the Court's standing analysis has
changed over time. Rather than commenting on the pros and cons
of these developments, the following section of this Article analyzes
the effect the changes in the standing doctrine have on the political
question doctrine. Specifically, if the purpose of the modern
standing doctrine is to protect the separation of powers among the
three branches of the federal government,14 9 what purpose, if any,
does the political question doctrine serve?
V. The Overlap of the Standing and the Political Question
Doctrines
The political question doctrine is based upon the notion that
certain subjects are inappropriate for judicial review and should be
left to and addressed by the political branches of the government,
even though all of the jurisdictional and other justiciability require-
ments are satisfied." ° It is well settled that the "nonjusticiability
of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of
powers." 151  Beyond this general statement, however, few com-
148. Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 618-19.
149. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,752 (1984) ("[T]he law of Art. III standing is built
on a single basic idea - the idea of separation of powers.").
150. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 142.
151. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
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mentators agree on the appropriate scope of or rationale for the
doctrine.
112
On one hand, some commentators have asserted that the only
justifiable rationale for allowing a court to refuse judicial review
under the political question doctrine is "that the Constitution has
committed the determination of the issue to another agency of
government than the courts., 15 3  According to this school of
thought, the judicial branch does not forgo its duty to interpret the
Constitution; instead, it makes the determination that an issue has
been committed to one of the political branches of government
through the normal process of constitutional interpretation.'-'
On the other hand, other commentators have asserted that the
political question doctrine is based, not on constitutional construc-
tion and principle, but rather on flexibility and prudence.'55
Professor Alexander Bickel offered the following justification for
the doctrine:
Such is the basis of the political-question doctrine: the court's
sense of lack of capacity, compounded in unequal parts of the
strangeness of the issue and the suspicion that it will have to
yield more often and more substantially to expediency than to
principle; the sheer momentousness of it, which unbalances
judgment and prevents one from subsuming the normal calcula-
tions of probabilities; the anxiety not so much that judicial
judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it should be, but
won't; finally and in sum ("in a mature democracy"), the inner
vulnerability of an institution which is electorally irresponsible
and has no earth to draw strength from.156
The Court has not defined the attributes of the political
question doctrine with clarity or consistency. 57 In the leading
case describing the doctrine, the Court appeared to lend support
both to Professor Wechsler's requirement that the issue be
152. Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question," 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1031,1031 (1984-1985) ("The [political question] doctrine has always proven to be an enigma
to commentators. Not only have they disagreed about its wisdom and validity. . ., but they
have also differed significantly over the doctrine's scope and rationale.").
153. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 7-9 (1959).
154. Id.
155. Bickel, supra note 96, at'46.
156. Id. at 75 (quoting Greene v. McElroy, 254 F.2d 944, 954 (D.C. Cir. (1958))).
157. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962), the Court stated that the doctrine's
attributes "diverge, combine, appear, and disappear in seeming disorderliness."
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constitutionally committed to another branch and to Professor
Bickel's prudential concerns.118  In Baker v. Carr, the Court
stated:
It is apparent that several formulations ... may describe
a political question, although each has one or more elements
which identify it as essentially a function of the separation of
powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertak-
ing independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question 59
Although the Court has quoted this language in virtually every
political question case it has considered since Baker, these formula-
tions are not particularly useful in identifying political ques-
tions."6° For example, the text of the Constitution does not even
discuss judicial review of its own provisions let alone limit it by
creating a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
[an] issue to a coordinate political department.' 16' Moreover,
because the Constitution was drafted with the intent that it would
adapt to changing conditions and values, many justiciable constitu-
tional provisions require the federal courts to interpret broad,
open-textured language and to develop judicial standards for
enforcement. 62 Thus, it is difficult to determine when a provision
will be subject to judicial interpretation and when a court will find
a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards."1"
The last four attributes listed in Baker are phrased in such
conclusory terms that they beg the question of how one may
158. See id. at 217.
159. Id.
160. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 144-45.
161. Id. at 145.
162. Id. For example, one would think that the Due Process Clause would be a prime
example of a constitutional clause that lacks "judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" and yet the Court has not shied away from interpreting it.
163. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
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identify a political question. For example, the Court provided no
criteria for ascertaining when a "policy determination" is "clearly
for nonjudicial discretion."1" Similarly, the Court did not explain
how to determine when it is permissible for a court to review
conduct by another branch of the federal government and in what
instances such review will express lack of "respect."165 Likewise,
the Court did not elaborate on when an "unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision" exists, or when the
"potentiality of embarrassment" is sufficiently high to warrant
declaring the case nonjusticiable.' 6  Thus, while the Court in
Baker defined the characteristics of a political question, these
characteristics do not provide a meaningful way for lower courts to
identify political questions.
While the Baker attributes do not provide specific criteria for
identifying political questions, they do carry a common thread:
each attribute focuses on the appropriate role of the federal courts
vis-a-vis the other branches of the federal government. The first
three Baker attributes - a "commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department"; "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards"; and the impossibility of deciding without
making "policy determination[s] of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion"167 - focus on whether the federal courts have the
power and competence to determine the issue presented, or put
another way, whether the alleged injury is judicially cognizable.
These attributes attempt to determine whether the asserted claim
falls within the policy-making prerogative of the representative
branches of the government, or whether the claim implicates a
constitutional limitation that is intended to be enforced by the
nonrepresentative judiciary."6
On the other hand, the last three Baker attributes - "the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government"; "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made"; and "the potentiality of embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
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ments on one question"' 69 - focus on the federal courts' ability
to adequately redress the issue presented without infringing on the
powers of the other coequal branches of the federal government.
These attributes do not derive from specific constitutional limita-
tions. Rather, the last three attributes derive from the courts'
exercise of remedial prudence and discretion in light of general
principles of separation of powers.
By categorizing the political question attributes set out in
Baker in terms of cognizability and redressability, the overlap
between the political question doctrine and the modem standing
doctrine becomes apparent. Specifically, because the modern
standing doctrine requires the federal courts to interpret the three
requirements of standing - injury, causation, and redressability -
in light of the principles of separation of powers, one may argue
that the standing analysis as it has evolved has subsumed the
concerns that led the Court in Baker to declare an issue to be a
nonjusticiable political question. In essence, it appears that the two
doctrines have converged.
VI. Post-Baker Political Question Cases
Since Baker, a majority of the Court has dismissed only two
cases on the ground that the issue involved a nonjusticiable political
question. 7 In Nixon v. United States, 7' the Court held that a
challenge to the Senate impeachment procedures presented a
nonjusticiable political question because the issue was constitution-
ally committed to the Senate, and there were no judicially manage-
able standards for review." In Gilligan v. Morgan," the Court
held that a challenge to the training, weaponry, and orders of the
National Guard presented a nonjusticiable political question
because the Court could not fashion appropriate relief without
invading "critical areas of responsibility vested by the Constitution
in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government."' 74
Although the Court relied on the political question doctrine in both
169. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
170. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979), a plurality of the Court held that a
challenge to the termination of a treaty with Taiwan posed a nonjusticiable political question.
171. 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
172. Id. at 226.
173. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
174. Id. at 7.
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of these cases, a review of these cases reveals that the Court could
have reached the same result by applying a standing analysis.
In Nixon, the former Chief Judge of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Walter L. Nixon
("Nixon"), was convicted on criminal charges and sentenced to
prison.175 While serving his prison sentence, Nixon continued to
receive his judicial salary.176 The House of Representatives
sought Nixon's impeachment charging Nixon with committing
criminal activity and bringing disrepute on the federal judiciary.177
The Senate voted to appoint a committee to receive evidence and
take testimony regarding Nixon's impeachment. 78 Ultimately,
the full Senate voted by more than a two-thirds majority to convict
Nixon on the articles and remove him from office.17 9 Nixon filed
suit challenging the impeachment on the ground that the appoint-
ment of a subcommittee to collect evidence violated the Impeach-
ment Trial Clause.1" The Impeachment Trial Clause requires the
full Senate to "try" impeachments.8 Nixon requested the Court
to declare his impeachment void and to reinstate his judicial salary
and privileges.1"
The Court held that "the word 'try' in the first sentence of the
Impeachment Trial Clause lacks sufficient precision to afford any
judicially manageable standard of review of the Senate's ac-
tions . . . ."" This conclusion places the issue squarely within the
parameters of the political question doctrine as set forth in Baker.
However, the Court's reasoning for denying review does not
illuminate how the Court arrived at a conclusion based on the
political question doctrine. The Court refused to hold that the
Framers intended to limit the methods by which the Senate could
"try" impeachments because the word "try" is susceptible to a
175. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 226-27.
178. Id. at 227.
179. Id. at 228.
180. The Impeachment Trial Clause states:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for
that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, ci. 6 (emphasis added).
181. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
182. Id. at 228.
183. Id. at 230.
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variety of definitions.l" 4 While the word "try" is susceptible to
different interpretations, one may argue that "'try' presents no
greater, and perhaps fewer, interpretive difficulties than some other
constitutional standards that have been found amendable to
familiar techniques of judicial construction, including, for example,
'Commerce... among the several States'... and 'due process of
law."' 5  While the word "try" is not as precise as the other
requirements in the Impeachment Trial Clause, many justiciable
constitutional provisions .are written in similarly broad, open-
textured language.
186
The Court also held that the use of the word "sole" in the
Impeachment Trial Clause represents a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department."8 While it is true that the Constitution grants to the
Senate exclusive power to try impeachments, this does not
necessarily mean that the Senate shall have final responsibility for
determining the scope and nature of such power. For example, in
Article I, Section 8, the Constitution commits to Congress exclusive
responsibility for many governmental functions.8 Yet, the courts
retain the power to determine whether the Congress has acted
within the powers conferred." 9 In Nixon, on the other hand,. the
Court concluded that if the S nate's impeachment procedures were
subject to judicial review, the Senate would not have the "sole"
power of impeachment but, rather, would be sharing that power
with the judiciary.1" This conclusion assumes that judicial review
of impeachment procedures is the same as judicial determination
of whether to impeach."' However, rather than determining
whether Nixon should be acquitted or convicted - which it would
not be empowered to do - the Court was merely asked to review
184. Id. The Court cited the following definitions of "try": "to examine"; "to examine
as a judge": "to examine or investigate judicially"; "to conduct the trial of"; "to put to the
test by experiment, investigation, or trial"; and "to examine as a judge; to bring before a
judicial tribunal." Id.
185. Id. at 247 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
186. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 73, at 145.
187. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228.
188. Among the governmental functions committed exclusively to Congress are the power
to tax and the power to pay debts and to provide for the common defense and welfare of the
United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
189. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 239 (White, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 231.
191. See Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other
Nixon v. United States, 1993 SuP. Cr. REV. 125, 129.
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the procedures employed by the Senate in reaching its decision.
Thus, even if the Court had chosen to review the case, the Senate
still would have retained the "sole" power to try impeachments.
The most persuasive portion of the Court's analysis deals with
the drafting history of the Impeachment Trial Clause. The history
of the Constitutional Convention indicates that the Framers of the
Constitution believed impeachment trials should be conducted by
representatives of the people and that the judiciary lacked the
political fortitude to execute an impeachment trial or carry out its
judgment. The Framers asserted that the power to try impeach-
ments should not rest with such a small number of individuals,
particularly when the same body would conduct a related criminal
trial, and that judicial involvement in the impeachment process
would "eviscerate the 'important constitutional check' placed on
the Judiciary."' 92  Based on this historical evidence, the Nixon
Court concluded that the Framers intended to grant impeachment
power exclusively to the legislature. While this reasoning is
persuasive, it does not directly implicate any of the Baker political
question attributes. Instead, the Court appears to have been
conducting a standing analysis of whether the claim asserted by
Nixon - violation of the Impeachment Trial Clause - presented
a judicially cognizable injury.
According to Professor Nichol, judicial cognizability should
focus on two factors: (1) the "public acceptance of the interest in
question"; and (2) the appropriate role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the
other branches of government.' 9' In Nixon, the plaintiff alleged
that the Senate violated the Impeachment Trial Clause by failing
to "try" him. The first factor of Nichol's cognizability analysis is
satisfied because the interest is incorporated in the text of the
Constitution - probative evidence that the interest is accepted as
a public value. Cognizability, thus, depends on the second factor
- whether the issue falls within the policy-making prerogative of
the representative branches or whether it implicates a constitutional
limitation that is intended to be enforced by the nonrepresentative
judicial branch.194
The Court in Nixon held that the Impeachment Trial Clause
does not place a judicially enforceable constitutional limitation on
192. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 235.
193. Nichol, supra note 70, at 1943.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 138-42.
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the Senate's power to "try" impeachment.1 95  In reaching this
conclusion, the Court distinguished Powell v. McCormack,196 in
which it refused to apply the political question doctrine. 97 In
Powell, the Court reasoned that the word "qualifications" contained
in Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution,19 is modified by the
three requirements for membership in the House contained in
Article I, Section 2.9 Powell held that while each House shall
be the judge of the qualifications of its own members, the Constitu-
tion defines the outer bounds of these qualifications.2" Thus, the
situation in Powell presented a judicially cognizable interest
because it implicated a judicially enforceable constitutional
limitation. Unlike the situation presented in Powell, the Nixon
Court determined that the case did not involve a judicially
cognizable interest. In essence, the Nixon Court concluded that the
plaintiff had not presented a judicially cognizable injury because
the power to "try" impeachments falls squarely within the policy-
making prerogative of the Senate; hence, no judicially enforceable
limitations on the Senate's power to try impeachments exists.21
Pursuant to this analysis, the Court could have avoided reliance
upon the political question doctrine merely by dismissing the case
for lack of standing because Nixon failed to show that he suffered
injury in fact to a judicially cognizable injury.2'
In Gilligan v. Morgan,2W3 a group of students at Kent State
University brought suit alleging that during a period of civil
disorder, the Ohio National Guard violated their rights of speech
and assembly and caused injury or death to some students.
2°4
The students sought an injunction restraining the Ohio National
Guard from committing future violations of students' constitutional
195. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238.
196. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
197. Id. at 548-49.
198. Id. at 520-22. Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution states: "Each House shall be
the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members .... "
199. Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution requires that a member of the
House must be at least 25 years of age, a citizen of the United States for no less than seven
years, and an inhabitant of the State he is chosen to represent.
200. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 237.
201. Id. at 237-38.
202. The Nixon Court also noted that "the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning
relief counsel against justiciability." Id. at 236.
203. 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
204. Id. at 3.
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rights. 5 The Court found it "important to note" that the stu-
dents did not seek damages for injuries sustained or an injunction
for "imminently threatened unlawful action."'  Rather, the
plaintiffs made a "broad call on judicial power to assume continu-
ing regulatory jurisdiction over the activities of the Ohio National
Guard."'  It was this "far-reaching demand for relief' that trou-
bled the Court.' 8 In holding that the case did not present a
justiciable controversy, the Court cited a combination of deficien-
cies, including "the advisory nature of the judicial declaration
sought[,] ... [the fact] that the nature of the questions to be
resolved on remand are subjects committed expressly to the
political branches of government[,]... [and] the uncertainties as to
whether a live controversy still exists and the infirmity of the
posture of respondents as to standing ....
Ten years after the Court decided Gilligan, it was faced with
a strikingly similar situation in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.21°
In Lyons, the Court refused to grant the equitable relief requested
- relief that would have required overseeing the conduct of the
Los Angeles Police Department on a continuing basis - because
the plaintiff lacked standing.211 In Lyons, a plaintiff who was
allegedly subjected to an illegal chokehold by members of the Los
Angeles Police Department was denied standing to seek an
injunction prohibiting the Los Angeles Police Department from
applying chokeholds in the future.212  Although he had standing
205. Id. The students also sought injunctive relief against the governor of Ohio
restraining him from "prematurely" calling the National Guard in the future and a
declaratory judgment that section 2923.55 of the Ohio Revised Code is unconstitutional. The
lower courts dismissed these claims and respondents did not seek certiorari with respect to
these claims. Id. at 3-4.
206. Id. at 5.
207. Id.
208. Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 5.
209. Id. at 10. Although the Court cited a number of justiciability deficiencies, its
analysis focused on Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 of the Constitution, which vests in
Congress the power to organize, arm, and discipline the Militia. Based on this provision and
the fact that Congress had authorized the President to prescribe regulations governing
organization and discipline of the National Guard, the Court held that "[tlhe relief sought
by respondents, requiring initial judicial review and continuing surveillance by a federal court
over the training, weaponry, and orders of the Guard, would ... embrace critical areas of
responsibility vested by the Constitution in the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
government." ld. at 7.
210. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
211. Id. at 105.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 112-21.
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to seek damages for the injuries he sustained during the alleged
incident, he did not have standing to obtain equitable relief because
he could not show any real or immediate threat that he would
again be subjected to an illegal chokehold.2 t3
During the intervening years between Gilligan and Lyons, the
Court refocused the standing analysis, emphasizing that standing
served to protect the limited role of the federal courts vis-a-vis
other governmental bodies.214 In both Gilligan and Lyons, the
Court was troubled by the fact that the relief sought would require
the federal courts to oversee the activities of a separate governmen-
tal body. The political question doctrine was inapplicable in Lyons
because there was no threat that the Court would infringe on the
role of one of the political branches of the federal government.
Thus, the Court applied the modern standing doctrine to protect
the delicate balance of power between the state and federal
governments. Ten years earlier, the Gilligan Court relied upon a
combination of justiciability deficiencies - including that the issue
presented was a political question - to deny judicial review of the
activities of the Ohio National Guard. If Gilligan were decided
today, however, the Court could apply a standing analysis similar
to that applied in Lyons. Specifically, since the students in Gilligan
could not show that they were likely to be subjected to a similar
incident in the future, the Court could find that they lack standing
to obtain prospective relief against the Guard because they could
not allege an actual or imminently threatened injury.2 .*5  In this
manner, the Court could protect the delicate balance of powers
among the branches of the federal government by applying a
standing analysis. Instead, Gilligan stands as one of the last cases
in which the Court applied a political question analysis - albeit
weakly - to deny judicial review.
VII. Conclusion
In 1976 Professor Louis Henkin asserted that there is no need
for a separate political question doctrine. In making this assertion,
213. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105-06, 111; see supra note 117.
214. See supra part III.D. One year prior to Lyons, the Court described the standing
requirements as limitations on the federal judicial power "which confine federal courts to a
role consistent with a system of separated powers and which are traditionally thought to be
capable of resolution through the judicial process." Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
215. See Gilligan, 413 U.S. at 13-14 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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he relied in part on what he perceived to be the "new birth" of
judicial review.216 Noting that judicial review had become virtual-
ly a "birthright of every inhabitant,, 217 Professor Henkin stated
that the political question doctrine was not only unnecessary but
that it cried for strict and skeptical scrutiny.218 Since Professor
Henkin's article, the trend has been toward less - not more -
judicial review. Nonetheless, this Article submits that while the
contours of justiciability have changed significantly since 1976, these
changes - particularly changes in the doctrine of standing -
strengthen rather than weaken the assertion that there is no need
for a separate political question doctrine. Thus, this Article asks -
as Professor Henkin asked almost two decades ago - "[w]ould not
the part of the courts in our system, the institution of judicial
review, and their public and intellectual acceptance, fare better if
we broke open th[e political question] package, assigned its
authentic components elsewhere, and threw the package
away?
219
216. Henkin, supra note 1, at 625.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 600.
219. Id. at 625.
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